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COUNTING OFFENSES 
JEFFREY M. CHEMERINSKY† 
ABSTRACT 
  Is a criminal defendant who discharges a weapon five times in 
rapid succession guilty of one crime or several crimes? This question 
of how to divide charges has vexed legal philosophers and Supreme 
Court Justices. It is a question of profound importance, but one that 
legal scholarship has seldom addressed. The answer has an impact on 
each stage of a criminal justice prosecution. The difference between 
one charge and multiple charges can affect the likelihood of a plea 
bargain, the strategy for trial, and, if the defendant is convicted, the 
length of a prison sentence. This Note, citing numerous examples of 
these cases, shows that the decision to charge a defendant with 
multiple offenses is often arbitrary and inconsistent. This Note first 
categorizes the overlapping and confusing methods courts use in 
determining the number of offenses to allow. This Note then describes 
the implications of these decisions and why their inconsistencies 
undermine principles of fairness in some criminal justice trials. 
Finally, this Note proposes that courts should apply three existing 
legal doctrines when making these choices to promote fairer and more 
consistent decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Does a person who punches another person four times commit 
one crime or four? Does it matter if seconds, minutes, or hours 
separated the offensive contacts or if they took place in the same 
location or different locations? Should a man who forcibly penetrates 
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a woman three times be charged with one count of rape or three? Is a 
person who fires six shots at a patrol car guilty of one act of wanton 
endangerment or six? What standards should guide these 
determinations? As Chief Justice Warren acknowledged in a case 
addressing how to divide drug charges, “[t]he problem of multiple 
punishment is a vexing and recurring one.”1 
Although this issue arises frequently, few scholars have devoted 
attention to it.2 The law is unclear in this area, forcing prosecutors to 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether to charge a series of 
unlawful actions as a single, continuing course of conduct or as 
multiple separate offenses. How a prosecutor charges the unlawful 
conduct affects each stage of a criminal prosecution, from plea 
bargaining through sentencing. Charging a defendant with multiple 
counts can enhance the pressure to plead guilty and may unduly 
influence the offense to which a defendant pleads. Whether a 
defendant is convicted of one count or three counts can dramatically 
affect the sentence, both in terms of the statutory maximum and in 
terms of enhanced penalties under repeat-offender statutes. 
Widespread variation among prosecutions charging the same conduct 
as one or multiple offenses raises issues of fundamental fairness. 
This Note discusses how courts determine whether to treat a 
course of unlawful conduct as a single crime or as multiple criminal 
acts, presents problems with the existing approaches, and proposes a 
solution for courts addressing this problem in the future. Part I 
categorizes relevant cases and outlines the four different tests courts 
use to determine whether a defendant’s actions constitute a single 
offense or multiple offenses. Part II discusses how this charging 
discretion, unbounded by any clear rules, may undermine the fairness 
of criminal trials. Part III suggests using three established legal 
 
 1. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting). 
 2. Scholars have addressed a related but distinct subject of when a single act can lead to 
multiple offenses under different statutory provisions, as, for example, when an illegal entry into 
a home can be charged both as a trespass and a burglary. See, e.g., Kyden Creekpaum, Note, 
What’s Wrong with a Little More Double Jeopardy? A 21st Century Recalibration of an Ancient 
Individual Right, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (2007) (“With a few sensible exceptions, a 
convicted person cannot be re-prosecuted for any lesser⎯or greater⎯included offenses. The 
general rule protects individuals from multiple government prosecutions on substantially similar 
issues that would allow the government to . . . obtain additional punishment for conduct that has 
been already, if only partially, punished.” (footnote omitted)). This Note addresses whether the 
same incident could be charged as multiple offenses under the same statute, for example, as if 
the defendant went in and out of the window several times carrying multiple loads of stolen 
property. 
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doctrines to address significant problems of fairness and justice: First, 
courts should adhere to the rule of lenity and presume that—in cases 
of ambiguity—crimes are single offenses unless the legislature clearly 
indicates otherwise. Second, in cases in which multiple charges for a 
single occurrence are deemed appropriate, courts should ensure that 
the resulting sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Third, and finally, 
multiple offenses from the same conduct should not trigger habitual 
offender statutes. Courts applying these doctrines will ultimately 
reach more consistent and fair results.  
These tests will not provide courts with perfect answers on how 
many charges are appropriate. Such tests do not and cannot exist. The 
application of these three tests will, however, substantially alleviate 
the harms caused by the ambiguity in how to charge and punish these 
crimes. 
I.  ONE CRIME OR MANY CRIMES?: COURTS’ INCONSISTENT AND 
UNSATISFYING APPROACHES 
Describing the legal rule for when a particular act should be 
charged as one or multiple offenses proves difficult because the courts 
have not consistently approached this issue. Courts have employed 
four approaches for determining the unit of prosecution:  
(1) examining legislative intent, (2) looking to criminal impulse,  
(3) applying an “act”-based approach, and (4) analyzing the crime 
based on time units. These approaches overlap significantly, and few 
cases fit nicely in a single box—a court may consider the legislative 
intent behind the statute, and, additionally, try to determine if the 
conduct was motivated by separate impulses. Nonetheless it is useful 
to consider the four main methods courts employ. 
A. A Legislative Intent–Based Approach 
1. The Legislative-Intent Approach Defined.  In the vast majority 
of cases, the statute does not specify the unit of prosecution.3 Without 
 
 3. In some rare instances, the legislature specifically lays out the unit of prosecution. 
These statutes are not the topic of this Note. When the legislature spells out the unit of 
prosecution, the answer is settled; this Note addresses ambiguous cases that force courts to 
resolve whether the defendant is appropriately charged with one crime or several. For example, 
in Byrd v. State, 162 S.W. 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913), the court applied a statute that made each 
day of practicing medicine without a license its own crime, id. at 363. Byrd was prosecuted for 
two counts of this offense for practicing on two days, and the court upheld the conviction, 
CHEMERINSKY IN FINAL5.DOC 1/12/2009  12:06:45 PM 
712 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:709 
an explicit statutory provision, courts often infer the desired unit from 
other sources, including the findings of the legislature that passed the 
statute and individual legislators’ statements in enacting the statute. 
As one court acknowledged, “[t]he unit of prosecution of a statutory 
offense is generally a question of what the legislature intended to be 
the act or course of conduct prohibited by the statute for purposes of 
a single conviction and sentence.”4 
The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in the first case 
considering the appropriate unit of prosecution for multiple acts. In 
the case of In re Snow,5 the Supreme Court considered whether 
defendant Lorenzo Snow could be prosecuted for multiple counts of 
unlawful cohabitation when he continuously lived with seven women 
over a thirty-five month period.6 Snow was charged with violating a 
federal law that prohibited any male from residing with more than 
one woman. Each violation of the statute was punishable by six 
months in prison and a $300 fine.7 The trial court split Snow’s illegal 
conduct into three offenses, each comprising around one year, and 
Snow was convicted of three counts of illegal cohabitation for the 
thirty-five-month-long cohabitation.8 Later, Snow filed a writ of 
habeas corpus to overturn his conviction and reduce his sentence, 
claiming his actions constituted a single, continuous violation.9 
The Supreme Court overturned two of Snow’s three separate 
convictions, holding that, based on the legislative intent of the statute, 
Snow committed a single offense.10 In support of its reasoning in 
 
finding that “[n]either [charge] is a bar to the other, and the conviction in the other does not put 
him in jeopardy in this—they are not the same offenses, but entirely separate and distinct 
offenses.” Id. The Byrd case is an example of a statute that simply asks courts to apply a defined 
unit of prosecution. 
 4. Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485, 489 (Md. 1988). 
 5. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887). 
 6. Id. at 276, 282. 
 7. Id. at 281–82. The Court explained, 
The offence of cohabiting with more than one woman, in the sense of 
the . . . statute . . . may be committed by a man by living in the same house with two 
women whom he had theretofore acknowledged as his wives, and eating at their 
respective tables, and holding them out to the world by his language or conduct, or 
both, as his wives, though he may not occupy the same bed or sleep in the same room 
with them, or either of them, or have sexual intercourse with either of them. 
Id. at 281. 
 8. Id. at 277. 
 9. Id. at 279–80. 
 10. Id. at 282. 
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Snow, the Supreme Court relied11 on a British case, Crepps v. 
Durden,12 which involved the violation of a statute dictating “that no 
tradesman or other person shall do or exercise any worldly labour, 
business, or work of their ordinary calling on the Lord’s Day, works 
of necessity or charity only excepted” and prescribed a penalty of five 
shillings for violating the law.13 In Crepps, the defendant was initially 
charged with—and convicted of—four violations of the statute for 
“selling [four] small hot loaves of bread” on a single Sunday.14 Upon 
review, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding 
that the defendant could only be charged with one offense and not 
four.15 The court reasoned that by enacting the statute, Parliament 
intended to punish working on Sundays, and, thus, it should not 
matter whether the person worked for days, hours, or minutes.16 The 
court inferred that “the object which the legislature had in view in 
making the statute . . . was to punish a man for exercising his ordinary 
trade and calling on a Sunday.”17 Thus, the court determined that 
there “can be but one entire offence on one and the same day”18 and 
that even if the defendant “had continued baking from morning till 
night, it would still be but one offence.”19 The court ruled that 
whether a defendant is charged with multiple offenses “does not turn 
upon niceties; upon a computation how many hours distant the 
several bakings happened . . . but it goes upon the ground that the 
offence itself can be committed only once in the same day.”20  
In embracing the principles of Crepps, “th[e] Court [in Snow] 
expressly adopted the reasoning of Crepps that the proper unit of 
prosecution was completely dependent upon the legislature’s 
intent.”21 Since Snow, numerous courts, including the Supreme Court, 
 
 11. Id. at 283 (citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)). 
 12. Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.). 
 13. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 283 (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1285). 
 14. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1284). 
 15. Id. at 284 (citing Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287). 
 16. Id. (citing Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287). 
 17. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287). 
 18. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287). 
 19. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1285). 
 20. Id. at 285 (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287). 
 21. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 704 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The court 
in Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2005), came to a similar conclusion, id. at 
495. The court found that “[t]he singular form of ‘photograph,’ read in conjunction with the 
term ‘any,’ clearly indicates that the Legislature intended prosecution for each differing 
photograph.” Id. Thus separate counts were appropriate when the defendant shot multiple 
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have tried to ascertain whether an act constituted one or multiple 
counts by considering the legislative intent behind the criminal 
statute. In Ebeling v. Morgan,22 for example, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the defendant should be charged with one 
offense or separate offenses for unlawfully tearing into successive 
mailbags with the intent to steal the mail.23 Assessing whether the 
defendant could be charged with a separate count for each bag, the 
Court first turned to the language of the statute and the intent of the 
drafters.24 The Court emphasized that the legislative intent was clear: 
“Congress evidently intended to protect the mail in each sack, and to 
make an attack thereon in the manner described a distinct and 
separate offense.”25 After reviewing the legislative history of the 
statute, the Court held that the words of the statute “plainly indicate 
that it was the intention of the lawmakers to protect each and every 
mail bag from felonious injury and mutilation. Whenever any one 
mail bag is thus torn, cut, or injured, the offense is complete.”26 
Although the conduct at issue arguably arose from a single 
transaction, “the complete statutory offense was committed every 
time a mail bag was cut in the manner described, with the intent 
charged.”27 Thus the Court held that the defendant could be convicted 
of a separate crime for every mailbag he damaged.28 
2. The Flaws in the Legislative Intent Approach.  The legislative-
intent approach is deeply problematic. Generally legislative intent 
 
photographs of a minor in a sexual performance, even though each photograph involved the 
same minor captured in “a narrow timeframe.” Id. 
 22. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915). 
 23. Id. at 628. 
 24. Id. at 629. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 631. A defendant who cut into a single piece of mail seven times, however, would 
only have committed a single offense. See id. (“[P]roof of cutting and opening one sack 
completed the offense . . . .”). In a similar case, Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), the 
Supreme Court considered how many offenses could be charged to a defendant who mailed 
seven letters as part of a scheme to defraud, id. at 393. The defendant was convicted of seven 
counts, one for each letter he mailed. Id. He appealed, arguing that the statute should be 
construed to allow only a single charge for the entire scheme and that, if it were construed 
otherwise, it would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. Id. The Court rejected the constitutional argument and upheld the seven 
convictions, remarking the defendant’s “contentions need no extended answer.” Id. The Court, 
relying on the Ebeling decision, stated simply that Congress had the ability to “make each 
putting of a letter into the postoffice a separate offense.” Id. at 394.  
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approaches have been criticized for a number of shortcomings. For 
example, opponents have criticized the approach as “undemocratic 
(committee reports are not enacted), unreliable (history is often 
conflicting, and may even be planted to influence judges in the 
future), and incoherent (the record does not represent the views of all 
members of the legislature, so it cannot be evidence of ‘legislative 
intent’).”29 As Justice Scalia has written, “opinions using legislative 
history are often curiously casual, sometimes even careless, in their 
analysis . . . . [I]t is simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical 
attitude, when the point of . . . inquiry is the fairyland in which 
legislative history reflects what was in ‘the Congress’s mind.’”30 
Beyond the usual difficulties determining legislative intent, 
courts especially struggle to decipher legislatures’ intentions 
regarding how to charge offenses based on criminal statutes. 
Legislative findings and individual legislators’ statements often do not 
exist on the topic of the appropriate unit of prosecution: legislative 
history almost always is silent on how to define the unit of 
prosecution, and courts are left to invent, rather than discover, the 
legislative intent that they rely on. As Chief Justice Warren wrote, 
“[i]n every instance the problem is to ascertain what the legislature 
intended. Often the inquiry produces few if any enlightening results. 
Normally these are not problems that receive explicit legislative 
consideration.”31 
Even when legislative statements do exist, they may not provide 
reliable direction for courts because they may only provide abstract 
principles and not reliable guidance on how to construe the statute 
relative to the facts of a particular case. Legislative intent is often 
multifaceted—legislatures may intend for a crime to be treated as a 
single crime in some instances and multiple crimes in others—thus 
providing minimal guidance to courts interpreting the statute. When a 
legislature has several intentions or goals in mind, a court can choose 
whichever best fits its own preferences rather than truly conducting 
an analysis based on legislative intent.32 
 
 29. Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative 
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 427 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
 30. Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280–81 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 31. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 394 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting). 
 32. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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The failings of the approach are illustrated by the seminal 
Supreme Court case, Snow, which held that cohabitation over many 
years constituted one offense.33 Although the Snow Court claimed 
that it was basing its decision on legislative intent,34 a careful reading 
of the case reveals no discussion of the legislative intent nor any 
quotes from the legislature.35 Rather, the Court devoted the bulk of 
its analysis to drawing an analogy to Crepps, the case involving the 
sale of bread on Sundays.36 The analogy is inherently flawed, 
however, as the Court failed to explain why cohabiting over thirty-
five months was indistinguishable from selling four loaves of bread on 
a single day.37 If the baker opened his store every Sunday for ten 
years, the reasoning of the Crepps court suggested that the baker 
could be punished for every Sunday on which the statute was 
violated.38 The reasoning from Crepps may have transferred to Snow 
better if the issue in Snow had been whether Snow could be charged 
based on his number of wives; the number of wives with whom Snow 
cohabited appears analogous to the number of loaves of bread the 
Crepps defendant sold on a given Sunday. But Snow was not about 
that issue; Snow was about the time period of the cohabitation and 
whether it was an ongoing offense.39 Snow claimed to be, and has 
been read as, an endorsement of the importance of examining 
legislative intent,40 when in fact there are no cites to legislative history 
or proceedings in the case.41 It was an inadequately reasoned analysis 
of the indivisibility of certain kinds of conduct, which Part I.C 
discusses as the “act approach.”42 
The weakness in the Court’s analysis of the legislative intent in 
Snow is not simply a failure of that Court; rather it exemplifies the 
larger difficulty with this approach: courts lack precise standards for 
assessing whether the legislature intended to make a series of acts a 
 
 33. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887). 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 35. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 285. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)). 
 39. For a discussion of how the Snow court focused on the time period of the cohabitation 
to hold that a “continu[ous] offence of the character of the one in this case can be committed 
but once,” id. at 282, see infra notes 88–93. 
 40. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 41. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 274–86. 
 42. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.  
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single crime or several. In many cases, the legislature failed to 
consider the unit of prosecution at all or failed to consider most of the 
almost-unlimited number of situations that could arise. For example, 
in criminalizing the act of rape, any legislature intends as a matter of 
sheer logic that raping the same woman on two separate nights merits 
two separate counts of rape. The legislature, however, is unlikely to 
fully articulate the reasoning or engage in the difficult line drawing 
that is necessary. For example, is rape on two different nights 
distinguishable from circumstances in which a man penetrates a 
woman twice within a one hour period because she was able to get 
away briefly? Would the latter situation constitute two counts of rape 
as well? A legislature likely did not anticipate this kind of situation 
when enacting the rape law. Even when legislatures anticipate these 
issues, they likely avoid such questions for fear of creating too narrow 
a rule that punishes someone for only one offense when punishment 
for multiple offense is appropriate. As a result, courts traditionally 
offer little beyond conclusory language, like that employed in 
Ebeling,43 simply suggesting that the legislature clearly intended to 
punish each act separately. 
B. A Criminal Impulse–Based Approach 
1. The Criminal-Impulse Approach Defined.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Blockburger v. United States44 epitomizes the 
impulse test. The defendant was charged with five counts of violating 
the Harrison Narcotics Act.45 The jury returned a verdict of guilty as 
to the second, third, and fifth counts, each of which involved a sale of 
morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser.46 The second count 
 
 43. See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
 44. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932). 
 45. Id. at 300. 
 46. Id. at 301. The other issue was whether one incident constituted multiple, different 
offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Id. Counts two and three alleged that the drugs were not 
in or from the original stamped package, and count five charged that the sale alleged in count 
three was not made by a written order of the purchaser as required by the law. Id. Thus the 
question in the case was, when the defendant completed one act—one sale—and it violated two 
sections of the statute, did the accused commit two offenses or only one? Id. The Court held 
that the defendant committed two offenses. Id. at 304. The Court noted that the statute was 
aimed at the sale of drugs in violation of the requirements set forth in sections one and two. Id. 
The Court then established the standard it continues to use as the test for double jeopardy: 
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable 
rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
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charged a sale on a certain day of ten grains of the drug, and the third 
count charged a sale on the following day of eight grains to the same 
person.47 The defendant argued that two of the sales, “having been 
made to the same purchaser and following each other, with no 
substantial interval of time between the delivery of the drug in the 
first transaction and the payment for the second quantity sold, 
constitute[d] a single continuing offense.”48 The Court rejected this 
argument, noting that the Harrison Narcotic Act “does not create the 
offense of engaging in the business of selling . . . drugs, but penalizes 
any sale” and “[e]ach of several successive sales constitutes a distinct 
offense, however closely they may follow each other.”49 The Court 
determined that “[t]he distinction . . . is that, ‘when the impulse is 
single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may 
continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all 
unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments 
lie.’”50 On this reasoning, the Court found that the defendant’s first 
transaction resulted in a sale and the act came to an end when the sale 
was complete.51 The next sale “was not the result of the original 
impulse, but of a fresh one—that is to say, of a new bargain.”52 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court both applied impulse analysis 
and considered legislative intent in United States v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp.53 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation was charged with 
thirty-two separate counts of violating the minimum wage, overtime, 
and record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.54 
Counts one through six charged the employer with violating the 
minimum wage provisions in six separate weeks.55 Counts seven 
through twenty-six charged the employer with overtime violations in 
twenty separate weeks, amounting to one violation each week.56 The 
 
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not. 
Id. Applying that test, the Court concluded that although both sections were violated by one 
sale, two offenses were committed. Id. 
 47. Id. at 301. 
 48. Id. at 301–02. 
 49. Id. at 302. 
 50. Id. (quoting WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (11th ed. 1912)). 
 51. Id. at 303. 
 52. Id. 
 53. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1952). 
 54. Id. at 219. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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remaining counts alleged in the complaint concerned miscellaneous 
record-keeping violations.57 The trial court granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss all but three counts of the complaint and rejected 
the prosecution’s argument that the employer committed a separate 
offense each week it breached a statutory duty to each employee.58 
Holding that “it is a course of conduct rather than the separate items 
in such course that constitutes the punishable offense,” the trial court 
“ordered consolidation of the separate acts set forth in the 
information into three counts”59—one each for the minimum wage, 
overtime, and record-keeping violations.60 
The Supreme Court began by noting that the language of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act did not address the issue and then observed 
that the legislative intent was also unclear.61 Candidly acknowledging 
that “[i]t would be self-deceptive to claim that only one answer is 
possible to our problem,” the Court rejected the government’s 
construction of the statute on the ground that “[t]he offense made 
punishable under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a course of 
conduct. . . . [Thus] the statute compendiously treats as one offense all 
violations that arise from that singleness of thought, purpose or 
action, which may be deemed a single ‘impulse.’”62 
As an illustration, the Court noted that a managerial decision 
that certain activity was not work and therefore did not require 
payment under the Fair Labor Standards Act could not become 
multiple offenses by considering underpayment in a single week or to 
a single employee as a separate offense.63 By only precluding counting 
an ongoing violation stemming from a single decision as multiple 
violations of the same statute, the Court held open the possibility that 
the government could charge separate statutory offenses for separate 
courses of conduct.64 Thus, the Court implied that the government 
could bring separate charges for different decisions. For example, 
employers might commit two offenses by deciding twice that certain 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 220. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 220–21. 
 61. Id. at 221. 
 62. Id. at 224. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 225 (“Whether an aggregate of acts constitute a single course of conduct and 
therefore a single offense, or more than one, may not be capable of ascertainment merely from 
the bare allegations of an information and may have to await the trial on the facts.”). 
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conduct does not constitute work. The Court did not precisely define 
what constitutes a decision to undertake a single course of conduct 
and how to determine if one is made; it simply held that the facts 
before it constituted only three: one minimum wage violation, one 
overtime violation, and one record-keeping violation.65 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Sanchez-Rengifo 
v. United States66 also relied on the impulse test to support a 
conviction for four separate acts of rape over a span of two hours.67 
The court stated that “criminal acts are considered separate when 
there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute 
the two offenses, or when a subsequent criminal act was not the result 
of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’”68 The court held that the 
evidence could sustain four convictions because during the two hours 
of attack,69 the defendant came to “a fork in the road” four times, 
each time giving the defendant a chance to stop and reconsider his 
actions.70 The court reasoned that “[t]here was time during this two 
hour period for Sanchez-Rengifo to reflect as he ordered his victim 
into different positions after completing one form of sexual assault in 
order to undertake another to satisfy his new impulse.”71 The court 
concluded that when “the circumstances are such that the ‘defendant 
can be said to have realized that he has come to a fork in the road, 
and nevertheless decides to invade a different interest, then his 
successive intentions make him subject to cumulative punishment.’”72 
2. The Flaws in the Impulse Approach.  Relying on impulses in 
these cases as the critical factor for determining the unit of 
prosecution presents two problems. First, impulse is ambiguously 
 
 65. Id. at 220–21, 226 (“All we now decide is that the district judge correctly held that a 
single course of conduct does not constitute more than one offense under . . . the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.”). 
 66. Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351 (D.C. 2002). 
 67. Id. at 352–53 (affirming a conviction for four separate counts of child sexual abuse 
stemming from a two-hour continuous assault of one victim). 
 68. Id. at 355 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C. 1995)). 
 69. Id. at 353. 
 70. Id. at 357, 359 (quoting Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. 1985)). 
 71. Id. at 359. 
 72. Id. (quoting Owens, 497 A.2d at 1095); accord State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541, 542, 544 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that two separate acts of fondling during one car ride were two 
separate offenses); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39, 47–48 (W. Va. 1993). In State v. Williams, 
730 P.2d 1196, 1199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that fondling the victim’s breasts and 
fondling the victim’s genitalia within less than five minutes of each other constituted two 
separate offenses. 
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defined and thus not useful in deciding the number of crimes 
committed. Is an impulse synonymous with intent? If impulse and 
intent are different, precisely how are they different? For example, 
although the court in Sanchez-Rengifo broke the defendant’s actions 
into four impulses, it is possible that throughout the entire course of 
conduct he only had a single intent—to conduct the rape. If “impulse” 
and “intent” are the same or interchangeable, it raises the question 
why the court would use the word “impulse” rather than “intent.” 
Second, how does one determine an “impulse”? Is it a function 
of time or opportunity to retreat from criminality? Determining 
impulse based on forks in the road seems inherently and inevitably 
subjective. Defendants in both types of cases—those in which a single 
crime is charged and those in which multiple crimes are charged—
faced forks in the road. The defendant in Sanchez-Rengifo had many 
opportunities to stop but continued with the course of action: one 
could argue that every minute during which the assault continued—
each an opportunity to stop his unlawful activity—was a fork in the 
road. The employer who violated the Fair Labor Standards Act had 
many opportunities—at least every time a paycheck was issued—to 
reevaluate its business practices. Each passing second presents an 
opportunity for a person engaged in criminal activity to assess the 
evils of the action and to choose a different course of conduct. 
A great deal also depends on which “impulse” courts analyze 
because an action often has several different impulses or 
motivations.73 As Professor H.L.A. Hart explained in his famous essay 
on criminal acts and intentions, “[t]he performance of a human action 
is a very complex affair involving the co-presence and the co-
ordination of many different elements.”74 If in Blockburger the seller 
agreed to provide the buyer with a set amount of narcotics for a set 
price every week and then did so, would the arrangement be 
 
 73. The court held that 
the facts and circumstances of this case weigh[] in favor of finding that Soto’s multiple 
drug sales constituted separate and distinct offenses . . . . Each of the four sales took 
place on a different day and at a different place, with the exception that two of the 
sales occurred in the same parking lot. The separate sales were not motivated by a 
desire to obtain a single criminal objective. While Soto and other defendants 
convicted of drug sales may be motivated by the single criminal objective of selling 
drugs to relieve financial hardship, this court has held that the criminal plan of 
obtaining as much money as possible is too broad an objective to constitute a single 
criminal goal . . . . 
State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1997). 
 74. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 90 (rev. ed. 2008). 
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considered a single impulse because it was negotiated and agreed to 
only once, or would it be several impulses because of the multiple 
exchanges? If one analogizes the ongoing agreement to buy drugs to a 
commercial contract, one might think of it as a single contract or a 
single business decision, as the Supreme Court characterized the 
determination of pay practices in Universal C.I.T Credit Corp.75 On 
the other hand, if one views it as a series of separate agreements, it 
becomes a series of frauds. Impulse is simply too imprecise a concept 
on which to decide cases. 
C. An Act-Based Approach 
1. The Act-Based Approach Defined.  A third approach requires 
looking at the facts holistically to determine whether there was one 
continuous crime or several distinct crimes.76 Some courts, for 
example, analyze whether the actions were one whole act or whether 
they comprised several discrete acts by considering whether the acts 
are “separated by an evidentiary factor such as time, place, or 
intervening circumstance.”77 A continuous offense has been defined 
as “a breach of the criminal law not terminated by a single act or fact, 
but which subsists for a definite period and is intended to cover or 
apply to successive similar obligations or occurrences.”78 
Furthermore, as another court explained, “[s]ome crimes, by their 
very nature, tend to be committed in a single continuous episode 
rather than in a series of individually chargeable acts.”79 
The best example of this “acts” approach is the reasoning in 
Johnson v. Commonwealth,80 which affirmed the defendant’s multiple 
convictions for illegal gambling after playing poker for four 
consecutive hours.81 The defendant played “[seventy-five] or more 
combined contributions, designated by the witnesses as ‘pots’; that at 
the end of each deal of the cards the winner would take the pot, and 
 
 75. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952). 
 76. United States v. Prestenbach, 230 F.3d 780, 783 (5th Cir. 2000). This is sometimes called 
a fact-based approach. See, e.g., Morris v. United States, 622 A.2d 1116, 1130 (D.C. 1993) (“[A] 
fact-based approach remains appropriate where a defendant is convicted of two violations of the 
same statute.”). 
 77. Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255, 1257 (D.C. 1988). 
 78. State v. Johnson, 194 S.E. 319, 322 (N.C. 1937). 
 79. Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C. 1985). 
 80. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1923). 
 81. Id. at 388 (defining the act of illegal gambling as “engaging in a game of hazard or 
chance at which money or other property was bet, won, or lost”). 
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after that another or a new deal would be made with the same 
result.”82 The court ruled that each hand of cards and respective new 
wager accompanying it was a discrete act, and thus each could be 
charged as a separate offense.83 The court held that each act is 
“complete upon the determination of the event upon which the stake 
is made, and that the determination of another one upon which an 
independent separate and different stake is made would constitute 
and be a separate and distinct hazard or game.”84 Thus with each new 
hand, those “participating therein would be guilty of another and 
independent offense.”85 The court ruled that because a single hand 
could be a violation of the law, “it would seem to necessarily follow 
that a conviction or acquittal for playing one hand . . . [which] is a 
complete offense, would not be a bar to a prosecution for playing 
another hand, although both may have occurred at the same sitting.”86 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Snow, discussed above, 
provides another example. Although the Court couched its language 
in legislative intent when holding that there was only a single 
cohabitation,87 in reality the Court rested its decision mostly on an 
act-based approach.88 The Court emphasized that the indictment 
suggested that the nature of the offense was irreducible because the 
indictments plainly stated that “the defendant did on the day named 
and thereafter and continuously, for the time specified, live and 
cohabit with more than one woman.”89 The indictment emphasized 
that all of the offenses “were alike in all respects except that each 
covered a different period of time.”90 
The Court in Snow held that dividing the cohabitation into three 
separate offenses, as the lower court allowed, would be “wholly 
arbitrary.”91 The Court reasoned that once any divisions are made 
there is no clear place to stop and there could be any number of 
charges: “an indictment covering each of the thirty-five months, with 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 389. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. For a discussion of the legislative approach adopted by the Snow court, see supra Part 
I.A. 
 88. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887). 
 89. Id. at 281 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. at 276. 
 91. Id. at 282. 
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imprisonment for seventeen years and a half and fines amounting to 
$10,500, or even an indictment covering every week, with 
imprisonment for seventy-four years and fines amounting to $44,400; 
and so on, ad infinitum, for smaller periods of time.”92 The Court 
concluded that the rule should be that a “continu[ous] offence of the 
character of the one in this case can be committed but once . . . . [I]t 
was the mere will of the grand jury which divided the time among 
three indictments, and stopped short of dividing it among thirty-five, 
or one hundred and fifty-two, or even more.”93 
The court in Krueger v. Coplan94 also used an act-based approach 
when considering how to categorize a sexual offense in which, 
“[d]uring a twenty-five minute period, petitioner repeatedly . . . 
coaxed a two-year-old child to perform oral sex upon him.”95 The 
prosecution, by using videotape of the incident, split the twenty-five-
minute period into ninety separate offenses: “eighty counts of 
aggravated felonious sexual assault, seven counts of attempted 
aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of felonious sexual 
assault, and one count of simple assault.”96 The court allowed all these 
charges to go forward, holding that “each separate act or attempted 
act of fellatio constituted a distinct offense, and could not be 
consolidated into one count alleging a general course of conduct 
involving several incidents of intentional touching.”97 
Similarly, in State v. Shelton,98 the court considered whether a 
repetitive pattern of incest was a continuing offense or a single 
offense.99 The statute stated that a “person commits the offense of 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; see also State v. Grady, 524 S.E.2d 75, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that a 
man could only be prosecuted for one count of violating a statute that prohibited maintaining a 
dwelling for purposes of narcotics dealing, even though the man was caught making two drug 
sales from his house). 
 94. Krueger v. Coplan, 238 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.H. 2002). 
 95. Id. at 392. 
 96. Id. at 394. 
 97. Id.; cf. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 273 & n.7 (Ky. 2006) (holding that 
every act causing an injury was a separate criminal offense, and so the defendant committed 
seven assaults by burning the victim in seven places with a cigarette lighter). 
 98. State v. Shelton, 605 S.E.2d 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 99. Id. at 230. The Court also considered the legislative intent in a cursory manner and 
found it inconclusive. The Court evaluated the statute and found “[t]he statutory language does 
not reveal any legislative intent to prohibit prosecuting a defendant for more than one count of 
incest per victim.” Id.; see also State v. Richard, 786 A.2d 876, 878–79 (N.H. 2001) (conducting 
the same analysis in the context of a repeating pattern of sexual assaults and finding that each 
was an individual crime). 
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incest if the person engages in carnal intercourse with the 
person’s . . . child.”100 The defendant admitted to several acts of incest 
with two victims but challenged his multiple convictions on the 
ground that he could only be convicted of one count for each victim.101 
The court disagreed, holding that each time the defendant and the 
victim had intercourse was an independent crime.102 Unlike the 
Krueger court, however, the Shelton court did not break up each 
incident of intercourse into several acts.103 
In Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth,104 the court again applied a 
fact-based, acts approach and held that a course of conduct 
constituted separate offenses.105 In that case, the defendant106 fired his 
gun four times at police officers “at irregular intervals, with a lapse of 
as much as two minutes to as little as seconds between the shots.”107 
Hennemeyer managed to escape108 and the next day got in another 
conflict with police. This time Hennemeyer fired five shots at a police 
car over a roughly fifteen-minute period.109 The entire chase spanned 
over four miles and ended when the driver and Hennemeyer fled on 
foot.110 While fleeing, Hennemeyer fired one more shot at the 
pursuing police.111 Hennemeyer ran into an abandoned warehouse, 
where he soon was captured. 
 
 100. Shelton, 605 S.E.2d at 230 (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-178 
(2003)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 104. Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1979).  
 105. Id. at 215. Because the court in Hennemeyer claimed it was reaching its decision relying 
on legislative intent, id. at 214–15, this case also epitomizes the overlap between the different 
categories. This case belongs in this Section rather than Section A, which discusses legislative 
intent, however, because, although the court claimed it was looking at the intent, it never really 
explained how it determined what the intent was. Moreover, it never explained why the intent 
would justify treating the actions on day one different from day two. Thus, although this case 
could provide a dual function, it reinforces the weakness of both the legislative intent and act 
approach. 
 106. The court referred to Christopher Hennemeyer as a “nomad,” and the incident started 
when he was “about to relieve himself in front of the Pic Pac Market . . . and the manager 
protested.” Id. at 212. 
 107. Id. at 213. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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The trial judge ruled that the first four shots constituted a single 
course of conduct, whereas the six shots fired the next day were each 
considered discrete crimes.112 Thus, Hennemeyer was charged with 
and convicted of seven counts of wanton endangerment.113 
Hennemeyer was sentenced to seven years total: one year for the first 
four shots—which the court had merged into one offense—and one 
year for each of the six single-shot charges.114 Presumably his sentence 
was considerably greater than it would have been if the trial court had 
merged the six charges and run the sentences concurrently.115 The 
court upheld his conviction, reasoning that the legislature intended to 
punish each “particular act.”116 Because the legislature intended to 
punish each “particular act,” the court held that the defendant could 
be charged with one count for each shot fired rather than only one 
count for the entire continuing conduct of firing a gun.117 
By contrast, and seemingly in contradiction, the court in Smith v. 
United States118 held that a defendant committed a single assault when 
he beat the victim with a curling iron and hammer and then threw the 
victim down the stairs.119 The court held that “[t]he fact that a criminal 
episode of assault involves several blows or wounds, and different 
methods of administration, does not convert it into a case of multiple 
crimes for purposes of sentencing.”120 The court said that the 
determination is made on a case-by-case basis, and “[w]hile 
cumulative punishments for these crimes may be imposed in an 
appropriate case[,] . . . . [i]t must be clear from the record . . . that the 
actions and intent of defendant constitute distinct successive criminal 
episodes, rather than two phases of a single assault.”121 
2. The Flaws in the Act-Based Approach.  Courts’ descriptions of 
acts as complete or continuing often (perhaps inevitably) lack 
articulated principles. These descriptions, which are based on 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 212. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 214. 
 116. Id. at 215. 
 117. Id. The court did not object, though, to the trial court’s combining of the first four shots 
into one charge. Id. at 214. 
 118. Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 119. Id. at 1121. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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intuitions about the divisibility of certain conduct, appear either 
arbitrary or, perhaps, rest on the judges’ own views about the 
wrongfulness of some acts as opposed to others. In Snow, for 
example, the Court insisted that any subdivision of the time of the 
cohabitation would be arbitrary,122 but it failed to recognize as equally 
arbitrary its own decision to treat Snow’s conduct as a single, 
continuous act. Without some account of the considerations that 
made three or thirty-five or one-hundred counts arbitrary, the Court 
ended up with just another number—one. 
Moreover, the Court did not address other ends of justice, aside 
from the purely punitive aims of prosecution, that perhaps favored 
punishing the thirty-five-month-long cohabitation as multiple 
offenses.123 For example, if cohabitation violates a community’s sense 
of decency, then someone who cohabits for ten years would be more 
culpable than someone who cohabits for ten days and thus would 
deserve a more severe punishment.124 From the perspective of the 
wives, it might have been that each day they woke up to the 
realization that they were in a plural marriage was a new insult and a 
new day of suffering. By depicting the crime as one continuing 
offense, the Court overlooked the fact that during the ongoing 
cohabitation the defendant faced numerous choices, each of which 
would have allowed him to change course and end the illegal conduct, 
but chose to continue his illegal conduct. But if the Court had 
adopted this perspective, should it have imagined the defendant to 
have made his choices daily, weekly, or monthly? 
Perhaps most puzzling is the court’s decision in Hennemeyer: if 
firing four shots on the first day was a single offense, why was firing 
six shots on the second day six separate crimes?125 Did it matter that 
 
 122. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887). 
 123. Id. 
 124. One court employed a culpability analysis, determining that a defendant who moved 
three times violated a registration statute each time. People v. Meeks, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 452–
53 (Ct. App. 2004). The court reasoned that 
every time defendant moves, this triggers a new registration requirement, each of 
which continues indefinitely and overlaps with the one before it. However, each is a 
separate offense. The purpose of [the statute] is to insure that a defendant’s 
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. Under the circumstances of 
this case, failure to punish defendant for each failure to register would violate this 
purpose. A defendant who repeatedly moves without notifying authorities . . . is 
surely more culpable than one who fails to register following only one triggering 
event. 
Id. at 453. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
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the defendant fired the shots on the second day in different 
locations—over the course of a several-mile chase—whereas the 
defendant fired all shots on the first day from basically the same spot? 
It is unclear how much time mattered—the shots on the second day 
took place over a fifteen-minute span, whereas the shots on the first 
day all occurred within a few minutes. The court never discussed 
which facts led it to consolidate the first four shots into a single 
charge but to treat the next six shots as distinct acts. 
The rationale provided in Johnson—that the first poker hand 
was sufficient for prosecution and therefore each hand should 
constitute a separate offense126—is most unsatisfying. Many crimes 
could be split into several acts according to this justification. By this 
logic, the Court in Snow could have ruled that each night of 
cohabitation was illegal and therefore prosecution for one night of 
cohabitation should not bar prosecution for the other nights because 
one night by itself would have been enough for a criminal 
prosecution. 
The reasoning of the court in Krueger is suspect for the same 
reason. Was there really a separate crime committed by the defendant 
each time the child paused while being forced to perform oral sex? 
Was there not, as the Supreme Court has considered determinative in 
other situations,127 a singleness of thought, purpose, or action, that 
may be deemed a single impulse? How could this ever be determined 
in the typical case of sexual assault that is not recorded?128 Under the 
Court’s reasoning in Krueger, a single sexual assault would be 
virtually impossible to commit, given that nearly all such assaults 
would involve a series of stops and starts. The reasoning of both 
Krueger and Johnson would almost always favor splitting the offense 
into several crimes. 
D. A Time-Based Approach 
1. A Time-Based Approach Defined.  When assessing the number 
of crimes comitted, many courts examine the time period during 
which the acts took place. After all, if one were to consider why 
 
 126. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388, 389 (Ky. 1923). 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952) 
(consolidating multiple weeks of minimum wage and other violations into single counts because 
the violations arose from single impulses). For a discussion on the impulse approach, see supra 
Part I.B. 
 128. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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charging a suspect who fires five shots in fairly rapid succession with 
five separate counts is troubling, the issue of time instinctively comes 
to mind. The compressed time period, many would argue, indicates 
one criminal act. Some statutes specifically mention time. For 
example, Indiana’s criminal code defines a single episode of criminal 
conduct as “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely 
related in time, place, and circumstance.”129 
Courts often examine time in their analysis. In Hennemeyer, the 
court likely intuitively based its view that shooting at patrol cars on 
separate and consecutive days constituted two separate offenses in 
part on the passage of time.130 On the other hand, many courts have 
considered the time factor and rejected it as not determinative or 
insufficient. In State v. Soonalole,131 the court allowed a prosecutor to 
charge separate acts of fondling within one car ride as separate 
crimes.132 In State v. Rummer,133 the court upheld as separate offenses 
acts of fondling that consisted of touching breasts and genitals, 
respectively, during a brief attack.134 And, in Sanchez-Rengifo v. 
United States, the court held four sex acts committed over two hours 
to be separate offenses, but only considered time in the context of 
determining that the acts reflected separate impulses.135 On the other 
hand, time appeared to be the determining factor in allowing separate 
counts for injuries inflicted in Ratliff v. Commonwealth,136 when the 
trial court instructed the jury that there would be one count of 
criminal abuse related to “older” bruises on the victim’s body and 
another count for the “newer” bruises.137 
2. Flaws in the Time-Based Approach.  Although a rule based on 
time may seem straightforward and easy to administer, it would 
create several problems. Setting a standard based solely on a set time 
period would lead to unfair and arbitrary results. Why should the 
court choose fifteen minutes as opposed to ten hours; what measure 
would the court use to determine the appropriate amount of time? 
 
 129. IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2(b) (2004). 
 130. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 131. State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
 132. Id. at 543–44. 
 133. State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1993). 
 134. Id. at 50. 
 135. See Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351, 359 (D.C. 2002). 
 136. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 273 (Ky. 2006). 
 137. Id. 
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Rules would have to be tailored to set a different temporal limitation 
to each offense, as crimes such as rape or a payroll violation require 
different standards. Legislatures would struggle to define the time 
period fairly and courts would struggle to determine the time period 
during which the offense occured. If a statute presumed that acts 
committed within fifteen minutes were continuous, it would produce 
absurd results when defendants miss the time cutoff by seconds. For 
example, is a defendant who plays poker for sixteen minutes any 
more morally culpable than someone who plays for fifteen minutes? 
Would a different charge make sense solely on the basis of the one-
minute difference? 
Finally, any time standard would be flawed according to 
deterrence and retributive rationales of punishment. A rule that 
treats acts within a set time period as presumptively one crime would 
do nothing to deter someone from throwing an additional punch or 
illegally opening an additional piece of mail within that time frame.138 
A set-time-period rule would encourage, or at least not discourage, a 
person who has already committed one illegal act to repeat that or 
similar acts as often as possible within the set time period. Moreover, 
retributive theories of punishment would often be thwarted by 
punishment tied solely to a time period. If punishments are supposed 
to reflect the moral wrong committed, someone who threw ten 
punches against one victim in five minutes might be more morally 
culpable than someone who threw only one. Focusing exclusively on 
time would prevent considering moral culpability. 
II.  WHY THE LACK OF CLEAR STANDARDS IS TROUBLING 
This Part outlines three major reasons why determining when an 
act is a single crime or multiple criminal acts is important to criminal 
law. First, deciding whether conduct should be split into many acts or 
punished as one raises questions of fundamental fairness in the 
criminal justice system. Second, the ambiguity in the charging and 
punishing of these offenses increases the chances of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Finally, charging an offense as multiple crimes raises 
double jeopardy concerns. 
 
 138. Cf. People v. Fielder, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12, 16 (Ct. App. 2007) (depublished) (punishing a 
person only once for failing to report a change of address would give him an incentive to move 
multiple times without informing the police, with each move compounding the difficulty of 
surveilling him). 
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A. Issues of Fairness 
Dividing certain conduct into several distinct acts of criminality 
raises four questions of fundamental fairness. First, without the 
guidance of legislative intent in many of these cases there is no 
reliable metric to determine whether a punishment is just. Second, the 
division of one incident into dozens or scores of separate felonies may 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Third, dividing a single incident into multiple offenses 
allows the application of recidivist statutes in ways that raise due 
process concerns or at least raise serious questions of fairness. Finally, 
inconsistency in the law risks unfairness in the criminal process simply 
because defendants in similar positions are treated differently. 
1. Ambiguity in Legislative Intent Can Lead to Ambiguity in 
Determining Fair Punishments.  First, a fair process can easily be 
thwarted given the lack of clear legislative standards. Courts have 
long struggled to find an external source for determining whether a 
sentence is just. Ultimately, though, courts have not come up with a 
valid measure for “what type of punishment is the ‘right’ amount or 
type for any particular offense. History [has not been of] 
assist[ance] . . . as penalties for common law crimes have changed 
over time, and most of today’s crime[s] did not exist at common law. 
Precedent will not help . . . .”139  
Because no real external source can determine in most cases how 
much or what type of punishment is appropriate, “the Court has 
regularly deferred to the legislative selection of the ‘right’ 
punishment.”140 Legislative intent, however, as discussed in Part I.A, 
is unclear in the vast majority of these crimes.141 Given the ambiguity 
in legislative intent, courts lack a basis for determining whether a 
sentence is fair. Although legislative intent may be clear about the 
sentence per offense, the lack of clarity as to what constitutes an 
offense renders legislative intent almost useless as a guide in deciding 
how many offenses should be charged. Thus, although legislative 
 
 139. Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2000) (book 
review). 
 140. Id. In some ways, the question of a fair sentence is like the question of how many 
crimes to charge. In both situations, extremes—that is, sentences that are obviously too light or 
too heavy—are easily identifiable. But a great number of cases are bound to be questionable or 
borderline. 
 141. See supra Part I.A. 
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intent is the most common and traditional method for determining if 
a punishment fits a crime, it is of little or no use in determining if 
multiple charges and the resulting punishment are fair. 
2. The Potential for Disproportionate Sentencing.  A second and 
related fairness issue concerns whether the defendant receives a 
punishment proportionate to the crime committed within 
constitutional limitations.142 The law on disproportional sentences is a 
murky area143 and “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 
have been exceedingly rare.”144 Nonetheless, courts have at times 
concluded that certain sentences, even if intended by the legislature, 
are disproportionate and thus constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.145 The Supreme Court dealt with disproportionate 
sentencing in two key cases. First, in Coker v. Georgia,146 the Court 
held that imposing the death penalty was disproportionate for the 
 
 142. For a general discussion of the Eighth Amendment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972). In Furman, the Court explained, 
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted 
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no 
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less 
severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the 
command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized 
punishments upon those convicted of crimes. 
Id. at 282. 
 143. See Robert Batey, The Cost of Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities to Limit 
America’s Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 56 (2007) 
(“Indeed, a majority of the justices seems determined to limit the number of constitutionally 
disproportionate sentences of imprisonment to an infinitesimal few.”). 
 144. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 
 145. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008) (“The constitutional 
prohibition against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments mandates that the State’s power 
to punish ‘be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.’ Evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty, a hesitation that has special 
force where no life was taken in the commission of the crime.” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion))); Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 773 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a sentence of twenty-five years to life under California’s three strikes law for 
stealing a $199 VCR after two previous shoplifting convictions was cruel and unusual 
punishment); Banyard v. Duncan, 342 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a 
sentence of twenty-five years to life for possession of less than a gram of rock cocaine under 
California Three Strikes Law was cruel and unusual); State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 75 (Ariz. 2003) 
(en banc) (ruling a sentence of fifty-two years without possibility of parole for four counts of 
sexual misconduct with a minor cruel and unusual). 
 146. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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crime of raping an adult woman.147 Second, in Solem v. Helm,148 the 
Supreme Court held that a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole under a South Dakota recidivist statute was disproportionate 
to the offense of passing a bad check for $100 after several previous 
convictions.149 In both cases, the courts used a three-prong test to 
determine disproportionality: (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for 
the same crime in other jurisdictions.150 In Harmelin v. Michigan,151 the 
Court ruled that a life sentence for 650 grams of cocaine did not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.152 In a fractured opinion, 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that there is 
no proportionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment,153 
directly criticized Solem,154 and voted to uphold the conviction.155 
Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissented 
from the opinion, advocated for a robust proportionality requirement, 
and voted to strike down the life sentence.156 Justice Kennedy, joined 
by Justices O’Connor and Souter, wrote that there is a narrow 
proportionality requirement but that the life sentence for Harmelin 
did not violate the requirement.157 
Ewing v. California158 clarified the law when the Supreme Court 
upheld the application of the California three-strikes law159 against a 
defendant who had stolen three golf clubs, each worth $399, and was 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.160 In doing so, the Court 
 
 147. Id. at 597. Similarly, on Oct. 1, 2008, the Supreme Court held in Kennedy that 
imposition of the death penalty was likewise disproportionate for rape of a child. Kennedy, slip 
op. at 36. This ruling purportedly invalidates the Louisiana law along with the five other similar 
capital provisions then existing in Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. 
Id., slip op. at 12. 
 148. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 149. Id. at 303. 
 150. Id. at 292. 
 151. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 152. Id. at 994. 
 153. Id. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 154. See id. at 967 (“The error of Solem’s assumption is confirmed by the historical context 
and contemporaneous understanding of the English guarantee.”). 
 155. Id. at 996 (majority opinion). 
 156. Id. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 158. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 159. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 160. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17–18. 
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endorsed the “narrow” interpretation of the proportionality 
requirement.161 Although the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence has defined the proportionality requirement narrowly, 
at some point the charging of separate crimes can be so extreme as to 
be cruel and unusual punishment. 
The Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause (which has 
never been applied in these cases) are the sole constitutional 
restrictions on excessive sentencing. Part III.B discusses how courts 
should apply the Eighth Amendment in multiple units of prosecution 
cases to achieve more consistent and just results. 
3. The Danger in Applying Recidivist Statutes.  The dangers of an 
unfair sentence are magnified by the proliferation of habitual-
offender statutes. Many states have laws in place that allow harsher 
punishment for an offender who commits multiple crimes on the 
ground that the offender is a recidivist and therefore more 
incorrigible and deserving of harsher treatment.162 Additionally, these 
laws provide longer sentences to protect society by keeping these 
criminals off the street and deterring criminal activity.163 
The problem is that a person could be charged under a habitual-
offender statute for a single incident that is treated as multiple units 
of prosecution. The prosecutor’s decision in People v. Haskell164 
exemplifies this risk: the prosecutor charged Craig Haskell with four 
counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree for penetrating 
 
 161. Id. at 20–22. 
 162. Id. at 15 (“Between 1993 and 1995, [twenty-four] states and the Federal Government 
enacted three strikes laws. Though the three strikes laws vary from State to State, they share a 
common goal of protecting the public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for habitual 
felons.” (citation omitted)). 
 163. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of California’s three strikes law [is]: 
incapacitation.”). The California legislature initially adopted the three-strikes law as a statute, 
and voters then approved it as an initiative. Joy M. Donham, Third Strike or Merely a Foul Tip?: 
The Gross Disproportionality of Lockyer v. Andrade, 38 AKRON L. REV. 369, 373 (2005). Mike 
Reynolds, the father of a murdered child, first proposed the law. Id. But the well-publicized 
murder of young Polly Klaas ultimately guaranteed the law’s passage. See id. (“Three Strikes’ 
ultimate passage was most importantly influenced by the murder of Polly Klaas.”). Klaas, a 
twelve-year-old, was taken from her home in Petuluma, California, in October 1993 by an 
offender who had been convicted twice previously and had recently been paroled from state 
prison. Id. at 373 n.32. For an excellent discussion and critique of the California three-strikes 
law, see generally Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and 
Criminal Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55 (2001). 
 164. People v. Haskell, No. 251929, 2005 WL 1489480 (Mich. Ct. App. June 23, 2005) (per 
curiam). 
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the victim four times over a few minutes.165 The prosecutor 
accordingly sought and received an enhancement for Haskell under a 
habitual offender statute even though his only crimes occurred in 
those few minutes.166 The court held that “[e]ach forcible sexual 
penetration of the victim resulted in a separate conviction pursuant to 
the plain language of the statute and relevant case law.”167 Moreover, 
the judge, following Michigan state law, found these four convictions 
sufficient to constitute a continuing pattern of criminal behavior.168 
The court held that “the evidence clearly indicated that the defendant 
committed three or more crimes against the victim within a five year 
period,”169 so the court was entitled to impose a heightened sentence 
under the recidivist statute.170 Thus, for conduct that other courts may 
have treated as one act of rape, the Michigan court found several acts 
of rape as well as a continuing pattern of behavior that made him a 
habitual offender.171 
Decisions whether an act or series of acts can be charged as 
multiple offenses or as a single act presents significant ramifications if 
recidivist statutes apply in these situations. A prosecutor’s decision to 
charge an offense as multiple counts not only risks greater 
punishment based on the statutory penalty for each crime, but it also 
could dramatically change the penalty if the person is then charged as 
a habitual offender. Such a possibility significantly raises the stakes in 
the type of cases discussed in this Note and presents questions about 
the fundamental fairness of the process. Part III.C of this Note 
suggests that courts should consider decisions to charge offenses as 
multiple counts when deciding whether to apply recidivist statutes.  
4. The Danger of Inconsistency.  Finally, ambiguity regarding 
how many crimes to charge for a single act injects inconsistency into 
how crimes are punished. Even if a sentence does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment under either traditional-sentencing or enhanced-
sentencing statutes, concerns still remain about the fairness of the 
practice. Deciding how to charge these offenses can lead to 
inconsistent punishment and sentencing, inconsistencies which 
 
 165. Id. at *8. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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threaten the appearance of fairness, if not actual fairness, of the 
system. Congress passed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
specifically address the problems of disparate and inconsistent 
sentencing.172 The system of punishment and imprisonment is based 
on “a corresponding scale of penalties. Trivial offenses causing little 
harm must not be punished as severely as offences causing great 
harm . . . .”173 Inconsistent sentencing of two similar acts threatens the 
very foundation of what is considered fairness in punishment.174 
The potential for tremendously disparate sentences for similar 
acts also raises legitimacy concerns. Charging two defendants who 
committed similar acts with substantially different offenses and giving 
them significantly different sentences could weaken confidence in the 
justice system. For example, serious questions of the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system are presented, if, in one case, a man who 
forces a child to perform oral sex on him during a twenty-five-minute 
period is charged with one count of felony sexual abuse and, in 
another case, a different man is charged with ninety counts because 
the prosecutor believed the act stopped and started ninety times in 
that twenty-five minutes. The public, the victims, and the accused 
might reasonably conclude that crimes are defined and sentences are 
imposed not by the legislature, or even by judges obligated to treat 
like cases alike, but at the whim of prosecutors. 
 
 172. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2486 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The general 
object of Guidelines sentencing was the eminently laudable one of promoting substantial 
consistency in exercising judicial discretion to sentence within the range set by statute for a 
given crime.”). 
 173. HART, supra note 74, at 162. 
 174. By allowing judges to take a real-offense approach to sentencing, the Sentencing 
Guidelines attempt to remedy charging abuses. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL  
§ 1B1.3 (2004); see also David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing 
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 408 (1993) (“[A] ‘real-offense 
element’ is any sentencing factor not included in the definition of the offense of conviction and 
either established at trial or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea.”).  
  Real-offense sentencing counterbalances prosecutorial discretion:  
Linking the sentence imposed more closely to the offense of conviction, as all 
sentencing guidelines systems do, increases the prosecutor's influence on sentences 
because prosecutors have broad authority to select or reject the charges that might be 
brought against the offender. In theory, then, a charge-based guidelines system shifts 
a great deal of sentencing authority to prosecutors. Sentencing commissions have 
considered whether it is possible and appropriate to counter this enhanced 
prosecutorial influence by utilizing some version of real-offense sentencing. 
David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to Real-
Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 270 (2005). 
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B. Concerns about Prosecutorial Misconduct 
The decision to charge a person with one offense or many is a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion.175 Although prosecutorial 
discretion is a critical part of the criminal justice system, it also can be 
abused. For example, some argue that prosecutors manipulate the 
system of plea-bargaining by overcharging and thus increasing 
pressure on defendants to plead guilty.176 The ability to charge 
multiple acts instead of one act gives prosecutors enormous power.177 
A prosecutor who can make at least a colorable argument that an act 
is divisible then has a powerful weapon to use during plea bargaining 
even if the prosecutor thinks that the decision to file multiple charges 
might not withstand the scrutiny of a trial or appellate court. Many 
defendants facing lengthy sentences may be reluctant to test the 
prosecutor’s willingness to charge multiple offenses, and there is very 
little oversight of a prosecutor’s charging decisions.178 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court recognized this discretion when it upheld twenty theft 
charges for an ongoing theft that lasted eight months, noting that it 
was purely a matter of prosecutorial discretion whether to charge the 
defendant with twenty crimes of theft or just one for the aggregate 
total amount stolen.179 
Moreover, even if prosecutors do not wield it as a sword in plea 
bargaining, broad prosecutorial discretion in sentencing is 
 
 175. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
 176. See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal 
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 234 (“[F]ederal prosecutors can circumvent equality by 
manipulating offense levels through charge bargaining . . . .”). 
 177. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1525 (1981) (“Decisions whether and what to charge, and whether and on what terms to 
bargain, have been left in prosecutors’ hands with very few limitations.”). 
 178. See generally Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial 
Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 136 (2007) (“This vast discretionary 
authority is accompanied by little or no transparency. Indeed, prosecutors determine whom to 
charge, what charges to file, and how to obtain convictions for those charges in secret. This 
situation breeds potential for impropriety, as it vests in one official the power to invoke society’s 
harshest sanctions on the basis of ad hoc personal judgments, which can often be capricious or 
politically induced.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 179. State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490, 490 (La. 1986) (“[W]hen a person has been accused of 
committing a series of distinct thefts which are properly joinable in a single bill of information, 
the person may either be charged with one offense and sentenced upon conviction within the 
sentencing range for the grade of the offense determined by the aggregate amount of all of the 
thefts or may be charged with each separate offense and sentenced upon conviction within the 
sentencing range for the grade of each particular offense determined by the amount of that 
theft.”). 
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disquieting.180 Providing the prosecutor with the ability to decide 
whether to charge one count or fifty is unsettling because it vests so 
much unchecked power in a single person. The possibility of 
prosecutorial overzealousness in such a situation is not remote. 
Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized just this 
possibility in State v. Krueger,181 discussed in Part I.C.1, involving the 
ninety separate offenses arising from a twenty-five-minute period in 
which a child was sexually abused.182 Although ultimately upholding 
the right of the prosecutor to charge these separate offenses, the court 
was “decidedly critical of the prosecution’s decision.”183 As the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court concluded, “it is important to exercise 
discretion with more circumspection when charging crimes under 
these circumstances.”184 The court continued to emphasize the 
discretion and responsibility required from prosecutors because 
courts “place a great deal of responsibility upon prosecutors to 
exercise discretion without vengeance when charging a particular 
defendant. Unfortunately, the manner in which the indictments were 
charged in this case raises the specter of prosecutorial over-
zealousness.”185 
C. Double Jeopardy Problems 
Finally, filing multiple charges for the same conduct violates the 
prohibition on double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”186 The Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same 
 
 180. See Vorenberg, supra note 177, at 1554 (listing reasons why “[t]he existence and 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most fundamental principles of our 
system of justice and our basic notions of fair play and efficient criminal administration”). 
 181. State v. Krueger, 776 A.2d 720, 721 (N.H. 2001). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Krueger v. Coplan, 238 F. Supp. 2d 391, 394 n.1 (D.N.H. 2002). 
 184. Krueger, 776 A.2d at 722. 
 185. Id. (emphasis added). 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend V. Although the Amendment by its terms applies to life and limb, 
the Court has expanded the protection to apply to prison sentences and criminal fines. Jeffers v. 
United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503–04 
(1978) (discussing why a second prosecution may be unfairly burdensome to the defendant). 
There is less explicit discussion of the double jeopardy issue in relation to the multiple counts 
versus single offense issue that arises in the cases like Snow and Ebeling. See supra Part I.A.  
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offense;187 however it is unclear whether or how double jeopardy 
constrains prosecutors in defining an offense. 
Fear of violating the Double Jeopardy Clause has caused many 
courts to closely examine decisions concerning the units of 
prosecution. For example, in Foley v. Commonwealth,188 the court 
held that multiple convictions for fleeing and evading law 
enforcement violated the prohibition on double jeopardy.189 The 
defendant was accused of violating a statute that made it a crime for a 
person to “knowingly or wantonly disobey[] a direction to stop his or 
her motor vehicle, given by a person recognized to be a police 
officer.”190 The defendant disobeyed orders from several police 
officers while being chased and was prosecuted and convicted for two 
violations of the statute, including one violation after he crossed into 
a second county.191 The court “conclude[d] that fleeing or evading, 
under circumstances as occurred in this case, is a single continuous 
act, regardless of how many police officers may be considered to have 
given an order to stop.”192 Finding that the defendant’s conduct 
constituted a single crime, the court vacated the second conviction 
because it constituted multiple punishments as prohibited by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.193  
Thus, when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts for an 
event that should have been deemed a single criminal act, it violates 
the prohibition on double jeopardy. Using the facts in Snow as an 
example, if the prosecutor had charged Snow with only a single count 
 
 187. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
 188. Foley v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 734 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 
 189. Id. at 738; see also State v. Grady, 524 S.E.2d 75, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
multiple convictions for the continuing offense of maintaining a dwelling for narcotics dealings 
violated double jeopardy). 
 190. Foley, 233 S.W.3d at 736 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.095(1)(a) (West 2007)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. The court applied a combination of the impulse and complete act analyses, stating: 
the intent to disregard a police officer’s order to stop and then to flee or evade is 
made when the initial officer gives the direction to stop. That intent does not change 
simply because other officers become involved. Appellant herein failed to obey a 
lawful directive of the Commonwealth. His continued disregard constituted a single 
event without any sufficient break in conduct and time, and thus cannot be parsed 
into separate and distinct offenses. 
Id. at 737–38. 
 193. Id. at 738; see also People v. Batterman, 824 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(considering the same issue and deciding “that the acts of his offense carried him [through two 
counties] does not allow both counties to prosecute him without violating the constitutional 
prohibitions against double jeopardy”). But see State v. Mitchell, 719 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (considering the same issue and reaching the opposite conclusion). 
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for the first year of cohabitation, the prosecutor, according to the 
prohibition on double jeopardy, could not then charge Snow with a 
second or third count for the remaining time of his cohabitation. As 
the Supreme Court wrote in Brown v. Ohio,194 “[t]he Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can 
avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime 
into a series of temporal or spatial units.” 195 
III.  A THREE-PART SOLUTION 
Given these serious threats to the criminal justice system, this 
Part presents a three-part solution to the problem of sectioning 
multiple charges from a course of conduct: first, courts should apply 
the rule of lenity; second, courts should evaluate the charges under 
the Eighth Amendment; and third, courts should enforce a 
presumption against the application of repeat offender statutes. 
Although prosecutors cannot always make totally consistent charging 
decisions, courts adopting these standards could provide greater 
coherence and consistency in rulings and promote more just results. 
At a minimum, these three approaches would compel courts to 
scrutinize prosecutors’ charging decisions. And they would encourage 
courts to use different analytical methods rather than relying on 
standard approaches, described in Part I, that do not satisfy the 
requirements of logic, clarity, and determinacy.  
These suggested approaches are not meant to determine the 
correct number or numbers of charges or offenses. Rather, these tests 
aim to cure the symptoms—unfair, inconsistent, and cruel 
punishments—that result from the immutable problem of being 
unable to properly define an offense. Courts will always be left with 
the four flawed tests presented in Part I; the three suggested 
approaches, however, attempt to ensure that the system cannot be 
abused to punish defendants multiple times for conduct which should 
be considered a single crime. 
A. Apply the Rule of Lenity 
First, courts should adopt a consistent and strict application of 
the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity provides that when courts 
interpret criminal laws, “ambiguity should be resolved in favor of 
 
 194. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
 195. Id. at 169.  
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lenity . . . . It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to 
resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the 
imposition of a harsher punishment.”196 Thus, when ambiguities exist 
regarding whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for 
the same act or transgression, “the court should apply the rule of 
lenity to presume that the legislature did not intend multiple 
punishment.”197 
The rule of lenity would be helpful in these cases for three 
reasons. First, the rule of lenity provides important protection for 
defendants to ensure that they are not wrongly punished. The rule of 
lenity does not ensure one particular interpretation over another; 
rather it merely provides that when the statute is ambiguous and 
there is no clear indication of what Congress intended as the unit of 
prosecution, the court must choose the interpretation that is most 
favorable toward the criminal defendant.198 This interpretation 
matches general criminal law principles: a person’s behavior should 
not be criminalized unless the legislature clearly and precisely 
proscribes the behavior in a criminal code.199 In United States v. 
 
 196. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); see also In re Carleisha P., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
777, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Even if we were not confident in this conclusion, we would hold the 
statute was at least ambiguous on this point and apply the rule of lenity in Carleisha’s favor.”). 
The rule of lenity has “become the target of substantial criticism.” Note, The New Rule of 
Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006).  
Observers argue that courts apply the rule inconsistently, or even randomly. Many go 
further and claim that courts have stopped applying it altogether. These critics 
explain the routine invocations of the rule of lenity as mere lip service: courts may 
nominally acknowledge the rule, but they find statutes to be unambiguous and 
therefore decline to apply it unless they would have found for the defendant on other 
grounds anyway. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 197. State v. Landgraf, 913 P.2d 252, 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Franklin, 
865 P.2d 1209, 1213 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 198. See Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 393–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“The rule of lenity 
entitles the accused to the lesser of two penalties where the same conduct would support either 
a felony or misdemeanor conviction.” (quoting Quaweay v. State, 618 S.E.2d 707, 709 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005))); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these 
circumstances—where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s 
position is unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the 
defendant’s] favor.”). 
 199. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 
345–46 (“More than a simple canon of construction, this principle—known as the ‘rule of 
lenity’—is considered essential to securing a variety of values of near-constitutional stature. 
Narrow construction of criminal statutes, it is proclaimed, assures citizens fair notice of what the 
law proscribes; it constrains the discretion of law enforcement officials; and, most 
fundamentally, it embodies our legal system’s ‘instinctive distaste[] against men languishing in 
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Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., the Supreme Court invoked the rule of 
lenity (in concept but not explicitly in name) when determining that 
the employer could not be charged with multiple violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act for the same pay practices over several 
weeks’ time and involving multiple employees.200 The Court explained 
that given the stakes involved, the defendant deserved the benefit of 
the doubt.201 The Court found the statute was ambiguous and 
explained that when choosing between “two readings of what conduct 
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the 
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in 
language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal 
outlawry from some ambiguous implication.”202 
Second, the rule of lenity would limit prosecutorial discretion in 
these cases. Given the ambiguity in the statutory definition of 
offenses and the inevitable discretion that prosecutors must exercise, 
applying the rule of lenity helps protect defendants from abuse of this 
discretion. As one court said, applying the rule of lenity would 
“prevent zealous prosecutors and timorous judges from perceiving 
two offenses where the legislature intended only one.”203 
Third, applying the rule of lenity to the cases would provide 
greater predictability and coherence in results. In Snow, for example, 
the rule of lenity could have provided a principle for allowing only 
one count for a single cohabitation.204 
B. Evaluate the Sentence under the Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has ruled that grossly excessive punishments 
violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.205 Although 
“‘successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 
have been exceedingly rare. . . . ’ [the Court has found] that the 
proportionality principle ‘would . . . come into play in the extreme 
example . . . [such as] if a legislature made overtime parking a felony 
 
prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.’” (quotation error in original) (quoting 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971))). 
 200. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952). 
 201. Id. at 218–19. 
 202. Id. at 221–22.  
 203. State v. Landgraf, 913 P.2d 252, 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Peter Westen & 
Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 118). 
 204. See In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887) (describing potentially unfair applications of 
criminal laws as grounds for imposing less severe penalties). 
 205. For a review of these cases, see discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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punishable by life imprisonment.’”206 The Supreme Court in Ewing v. 
California endorsed Justice Kennedy’s test from Harmelin v. 
Michigan that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only 
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”207 
Despite the narrow proportionality requirement and courts’ 
hesitancy to invalidate sentences, the sheer arbitrariness of many of 
these cases is a perfect example of why these requirements should 
apply.208 To ensure fairness, courts should vigorously apply Solem’s 
three factors evaluating whether a punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment: (1) the gravity of the offense relative to the harshness of 
the punishment, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for the commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.209 
When a defendant receives a prolonged prison sentence on the 
basis of aggregated offenses, the court should consider the Eighth 
Amendment’s narrow proportionality requirement. For example, 
prosecutors could charge a defendant who illegally possessed a gun 
for one year with fifty-two offenses. If illegal gun possession were 
punishable by five years in prison, the defendant could be sentenced 
to 260 years in prison. Even under the Supreme Court’s narrow 
proportionality test, courts should hold that this sentence is 
disproportionate. Sentencing this defendant to 260 years in prison 
also would fail the three Solem factors. First, the gravity of the 
offense, as measured by the societal harm caused by the mere 
possession of a firearm for a one-year period, does not warrant a 260-
year sentence when offenses that cause far greater societal harm—
such as assaults, burglaries, and rapes—rarely if ever elicit 
equivalently harsh sentences. Second, other defendants charged with 
the same offense, including in other jurisdictions, do not receive 
similar sentences. Third, courts do not impose similarly harsh 
sentences for other, comparable crimes. Thus, by the Supreme 
Court’s standards, splitting criminal conduct into several crimes could 
be disproportionate to the offense and hence constitute cruel and 
 
 206. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (omissions in original) (quoting Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 n.11 (1980)). 
 207. Id. at 23 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). 
 208. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 209. For a discussion of Solem, see supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.  
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unusual punishment. Applying this standard consistently and 
rigorously would provide a vital protection. 
C. Employ a Presumption against Applying Repeat-Offender Statutes 
Perhaps most importantly, courts should enforce a strong 
presumption that if a defendant who commits an act that could be 
characterized as a single continuing offense is charged with multiple 
offenses, that person should not be sentenced under a recidivist 
statute. Unless the legislature clearly indicates a desire to punish a 
continuing act with multiple charges, multiple offenses should be 
presumptively excluded from the scope of recidivist statutes. In other 
words, even if a court determines that multiple charging is 
appropriate, the court still must assess separately whether enhanced 
sentencing as a habitual offender is appropriate. The questions are 
distinct, and an affirmative answer to the first question (that multiple 
charges are acceptable) should not necessarily lead to an affirmative 
answer to the second question (that a sentencing enhancement for 
recidivist offenders should apply). Rather, habitual-offender statutes 
should be reserved for offenders who truly exhibit a repeating pattern 
of criminality incapable of rehabilitation. 
The instances described in this Note are ill suited for habitual-
offender statutes because the two major rationales for these 
statutes—deterrence and inability to be rehabilitated—do not apply 
in these cases. First, the habitual offender statutes “are oriented 
towards deterring convicted criminals from again committing crime,” 
and deterrence does not apply to offenses such as those committed by 
Haskell.210 In Haskell, the defendant was charged as a habitual 
offender based on an episode of rape, occurring over a few minutes 
on a single night, that was divided into four counts based on four acts 
of penetration.211 A deterrence rationale entirely fails here because 
the defendant committed his acts so quickly—in a matter of 
minutes—he had no chance to reconsider his actions and thus be 
deterred by the threat of multiple criminal charges. Furthermore, the 
threat of receiving higher sentences as a recidivist was unlikely to 
deter his criminal behavior because it likely never occurred to him 
that his actions—which lasted only a few minutes212—would be split 
 
 210. Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 238 
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 211. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text. 
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into four offenses. The unpredictable nature of the multiple charges, 
as opposed to a single charge, likely negates any deterrence effect. 
The deterrence rationale of these habitual-offender statutes in 
general does not work when defendants do not have the opportunity 
to reflect on or change their behavior. 
The second rationale of habitual-offender laws is the failure of 
previous opportunities of rehabilitation. These recidivist laws 
represent a “legislative judgment . . . that offenders who have 
committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit 
felonies must be incapacitated.”213 Recidivist statutes are predicated 
on an assumption that these offenders are those “unable to bring 
[their] conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law 
of the State.”214 When habitual-offender statutes are applied to acts 
that occurred in a single transaction, like in Haskell,215 offenders lack 
the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. Nothing in Haskell’s 
record would lead to the conclusion that he could not be 
rehabilitated. Conduct during a single transaction cannot show the 
failure of previous rehabilitation attempts or the impossibility of 
future ones. 
Habitual-offender laws likely were not passed with these kinds of 
circumstances in mind, and yet they easily could be applied—and 
indeed have been applied—in these situations. If fidelity to legislative 
intent is the true test of a “fair sentence,” the combination of 
recidivist statutes with the ability to charge multiple offenses for what 
could be described as one crime inherently risks unfairness. Applying 
the recidivist statutes to multiple counts in the circumstances this 
Note describes is contrary to the legislative intent in establishing 
habitual-offender statutes. Although a legislature can determine the 
given sentence for a crime, “if [a state] wishes to effectively transform 
its ‘three strikes and you’re out’ sentencing scheme into a ‘one strike 
and you’re out’ scheme by double or triple-counting ‘same’ offenses, 
it should have to state explicitly that it intends a life sentence for the 
commission of a single particular crime.”216 
 
 213. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003). 
 214. Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)). 
 215. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text. 
 216. Klein, supra note 139, at 1010. 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem this Note addresses is one of fairness and justice. 
Deciding how many charges to bring in criminal cases profoundly 
affects the futures of many defendants. The lack of coherence in 
charging offenses serves no one’s interest—judges are forced to write 
confused opinions, prosecutors are unsure of how to charge 
defendants, and defendants are often punished unfairly. This Note 
presents three solutions that bring this discussion away from existing 
arbitrary principles and inconsistent tests and toward greater 
coherence and fairness in the law. No solution can ever perfectly 
determine how courts and prosecutors should charge offenses, but the 
three presented in this Note, taken together, may offer the best 
opportunity for courts to achieve fairer results. 
